Banking Regulation in China: The Role of Public and Private by W. He, He Wei Ping

By W. He, He Wei Ping

Banking rules in China offers an in-depth research of the country's modern banking regulatory process, concentrating on legislation in perform. by way of drawing on private and non-private curiosity theories when it comes to financial institution rules, He argues that managed improvement of the banking area reworked China's banks into extra market-oriented associations and elevated public quarter development. This paintings proves that financial institution legislation is the first capacity during which the chinese language executive achieves its political and monetary pursuits instead of utilizing it as a car for keeping effective monetary markets.

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146 Due to the moral 42 BANKING REGULATION IN CHINA hazard associated with deposit insurance schemes, depositors lack incentives to impose market discipline on bank management. 148 However, some research holds the opposite view that shareholders are natural risk-takers. 149 Therefore, with the presence of deposit insurance schemes, incentive structures—depositors, debt-holders, and shareholders—to monitor banks are unlikely to emerge. 151 Depositors, debt-holders, and (by definition) minority shareholders would have little incentive to monitor the risk-taking of State-owned banks, as ultimately they are protected by the government.

This chapter argues that private interests are the driving forces for banking regulation in China. 7 Chapter 8: Conclusion Chapter 8 concludes with a review of the findings of chapters 3 to 7 and draws these together to show a regulatory pattern consistent with the thesis outlined in the introduction that banking regulation in China is driven by the interest of the government, ultimately for economic and political stability. The book concludes that Chinese banking regulation does seek to achieve its goals such as that of promoting economic and social INTRODUCTION 25 development.

While the government may be prepared to act as lender of last resort in bad times, it is also important to implement applicable rules and BANKING REGULATORY THEORIES 33 standards concerning bank exit policies. 45 As the GFC made evident, the specialized United States banking insolvency regimes have worked fairly well. 47 Rigorous bank exit measures provide certainty in the event of financial turmoil. 48 The social objectives of banking regulation appear to be less obvious, but are just as important.

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